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Egypt's food subsidies (in 1996/97 5.5 percent of government expenditures or  US$1.1 bn.)
cover rationed oil and sugar (23 percent of subsidy cost) and unrationed bread and flour (77
percent). The subsidies enhance food security but are nontargeted and have substantial leakages.
This paper uses a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the short-run
effects of alternative food- subsidy scenarios. Savings from reduced subsidy spending are used to
reduce direct taxes uniformly for all household types. The model uses a 1996/97 database with
detailed household information. The simulated impact of targeting or eliminating oil and sugar
subsidies is small: disaggregated real household consumption changes by ±0.3 percent. It is
progressive if the subsidy is targeted to "the needy" (the bottom two quintiles in rural and urban
areas) and regressive if it is eliminated. The targeting of all food subsidies is pro-needy, in part
due to important indirect effects. It raises the consumption of the needy by 0.5 percent with, on
average, little change for the nonneedy. The strongest gains are recorded for the rural needy
(consumption increase by 1.0 percent). Food subsidy elimination is regressive: the needy suffer a
consumption loss of 1.1 percent. If the government savings instead are transferred to the needy,
the impact is reversed: consumption increases by 4.2 percent for needy households while the
nonneedy register a small loss. The overall policy implication of the paper is that there is scope
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1. INTRODUCTION
Egypt's food subsidy system currently covers four items: bread, flour, oil and sugar. The
system, which accounts for 5.5 percent of government expenditures, significantly enhances
household food security by assuring low-cost supplies of  calories and protein. However, the
system is not specifically targeted to low-income groups and some 15-20 percent of the subsidy
benefits leak—the commodities do not reach the intended consumers at subsidized prices. 
In this paper, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is used to explore the
short-run equilibrium effects of  a set of alternative options for the operation of Egypt’s food
subsidy system. The options covered involve targeting, and reducing and/or reorganizing the
subsidy system. The economy-wide perspective of the analysis makes it possible to consider the
broader economic repercussions of different policy options. The analysis highlights not only the
effects of policies on the micro level (for example, changes in household welfare), but also on the
macro level (for example, on the government budget) as well as the tradeoffs involved.
Section 2 provides a brief background, focusing on the role of Egypt's food subsidy system
in the national economy. In Section 3, the CGE model and its data base are presented. Section 4
is devoted to simulations, while Section 5 summarizes the results and extracts the policy
implications. The appendix includes additional data and simulation results as well as a
mathematical statement of the CGE model.The description of Egypt’s food subsidy system draws on Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali (1998)
1
and Gutner, Gomaa, and Nasser (1998).
2
2. FOOD SUBSIDIES IN THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY
1
Since the 1940s, Egypt's government has operated a system of food subsidies. In the 1970s,
the system expanded in terms of commodity coverage and rates of subsidization. At its peak, in
1980–81, it covered more than a dozen items. Food subsidy spending accounted for 14 percent of
total government spending and corresponded to 12.8 percent of total private consumption
(Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali 1998, p. 71; IMF 1995, p. 349). Since the early 1980s, the government
has gradually cut spending in this area, primarily by reducing the number of subsidized
commodities. In 1996–97, the system covered four commodities: bread, flour, cooking oil, and
sugar  and represented 5.5 percent of government spending and 1.9 percent of total private
consumption. Given that these commodities are tradable (Egypt is a net importer of wheat
products, edible oils, and sugar), the subsidy cost is sensitive to changes in world prices. 
Subsidized bread is available from bakeries for virtually every household in Egypt at a
fixed price in unlimited quantities. The geographical coverage of warehouses selling fixed-price
subsidized flour (all of which has an 82 percent extraction rate) is more limited, with no presence
in Egypt four major metropolitan areas. However, for most consumers with access to subsidized
flour, the quantities that they can purchase are unrationed. Oil and sugar are made available to
consumers in monthly quotas through ration cards, covering, in 1996–97, close to 70 percent of
the population. There are two types of ration cards, red and green. Red cards, which cover 7
percent of the ration-card holding population, are aimed at people in higher income professions
and offer the commodities at higher fixed prices (i.e., with lower subsidy rates). The remaining
93 percent of the covered population have green cards with lower prices (higher subsidy rates). In
practice, there is no strong correlation between household income and access to subsidies
through the ration card system (Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali 1998, p. 30). The consumption pattern for
oil and sugar is relatively undistorted, given that, for these commodities, most consumers
supplement the subsidized quantities with market purchases. From the perspective of the
households, the subsidy benefit from consumption of these commodities differs little from a cash
transfer. On the contrary, the bread and flour subsidy generates not only an income transfer, but3
also excessive consumption; i.e., bread is consumed beyond the point where its marginal value to
the consumers equals its economic price. 
In 1996, the government started a trial program substituting a wheat-maize flour blend
(with a 20 percent maize share) for all-wheat flour in the production of subsidized bread (United
States Department of Agriculture, 1996, pp. 9, 18-19; Financial Times, December 5, 1996). This
policy leads to reduced government spending for two reasons: the flour extraction rate is higher
for maize than for wheat flour and, for a typical year, the maize price is lower than the wheat
price—in 1996–97, it was 77 percent of the wheat price (Ministry of Agriculture 1998, pp. 142
and 235).
Tables 1 and 2 summarize data on the food subsidy system in 1996–97. Table 1 shows that
bread, which is subsidized at the highest rate, accounts for more than 60 percent of the total
subsidy cost. Out of the total food subsidy, some 18 percent is leaked   (in the sense that the
subsidized commodities do not reach the households but are diverted to other uses). The leakage
rate is lower for bread than for the other commodities. The information in Table 2 indicates that
per capita consumption is lower in rural than in urban areas. In terms of the absolute level of per
capita benefits, the rural population gains less from subsidies than does the urban population. If
benefits are measured as a share of consumption expenditures, the gains experienced by the rural
population are similar to those experienced by the urban population. Within each region, absolute
per capita benefits are similar across the different quintiles; however, in urban areas, subsidy
benefits are slightly more targeted to low-income groups. At the disaggregated commodity level,
the main difference is that flour is relatively more important in rural areas while bread is
relatively less important. In sum, the food subsidy system is in practice untargeted and subject to
substantial leakage.
This paper uses an economy-wide general-equilibrium model to explore the impact of a set
of alternative options for the operation of Egypt's food subsidy system. The options covered
involve targeting, and reducing and/or reorganizing the subsidy system. The microeconomic and
political-economy aspects of most of these options have been analyzed in Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali
(1998) and Gutner, Gomaa, and Nasser (1998). The economy-wide perspective of the analysis in
this paper makes it possible to consider the broader economic repercussions of different policy 4
Table 1—Food subsidies by commodity, 1996-97




Value Share Households Leakage Total
(LE bn.) ( percent) ( percent) ( percent) ( percent)
a
Baladi bread 2.3 61.7 88.5 11.5 100.0 56.9
Flour 0.6 14.9 70.4 29.6 100.0 43.1
Edible oil  0.4 10.3 72.2 27.8 100.0 54.1
Sugar 0.5 13.1 74.7 25.3 100.0 62.1
Total 3.7 100.0 82.3 17.7 100.0
Source: Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali (1998), pp. 71 and 87-92. 
US$1 = LE 3.39 (1996–97 average).
a
The oil and sugar subsidy rates are for green ration cards. The red card subsidy rates are 42.7 percent
b
and 43.2 percent, respectively.
Table 2—Food subsidies and the household economy, 1996-97
Annual Annual Benefit
subsidy household  as share of
benefit consumption consumption
(LE/capita) (LE/capita) ( percent)
Subsidy benefit by commodity
Bread Flour sugar Total 
( percent) ( percent) ( percent) ( percent)
Oil and
Rural households (by quintile)
         1 40.3 1272.7 3.2 59.7 18.7 21.6 100.0
         2 41.6 1676.6 2.5 51.9 25.2 22.8 100.0
         3 47.7 2141.6 2.2 59.1 20.8 20.1 100.0
         4 45.6 2687.5 1.7 54.5 23.4 22.1 100.0
         5 52.1 4585.1 1.1 56.0 22.7 21.3 100.0
        Average 45.5 2472.7 2.1 56.3 22.2 21.6 100.0
Urban households (by quintile)
         1 64.9 1736.3 3.7 77.4 5.0 17.7 100.0
         2 69.2 2492 2.8 75.5 4.9 19.5 100.0
         3 63.8 3416.1 1.9 79.1 1.9 19.0 100.0
         4 63.4 4726.8 1.3 77.6 2.1 20.3 100.0
         5 50.3 9628.4 0.5 70.1 3.6 26.3 100.0
        Average 62.3 4399.9 2.0 75.9 3.5 20.6 100.0
Source:  Ahmed, Bouis, and Ali (1998), pp. 95-96.
Note:  In 1996, 57 percent of Egypt’s resident population of 59.3 million lived in rural areas.5
options, including the consequences of alternative uses of government budgetary savings from
reduced subsidy spending and reduced leakage. Before presenting the simulations, we will first
turn to a description of the model and its database. See Löfgren (1994b) for a survey of CGE models of Egypt.
2
 Table A6 includes a mathematical model statement.
3
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3. THE EGYPT FOOD CGE MODEL: STRUCTURE AND DATA
Background
CGE models may be defined as economy-wide models the solutions to which depict a
simultaneous general equilibrium in all markets of the economy. They are widely applied to
policy analysis in developing countries and have a comparative advantage in the analysis of tax
and subsidy policies, in particular when there is a need to consider links between different
producing sectors, links between the macro and micro levels, and the disaggregated impact of
changes in policies and exogenous shocks on sectoral structure, household welfare, and income
distribution. CGE analyses of the Egyptian economy have a relatively long history, with the first
model dating back to 1976.
2
Our CGE model of Egypt, called the Food CGE model, starts from an earlier model of
Egypt (Löfgren and Kherallah 1998). It is in the tradition of trade-focused CGE models of
developing countries described in Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982). However, compared to
this earlier generation of models, it includes a wider range of features that are tailored to the
structure of the economy that is modeled. The distinguishing features of the current model
include a detailed treatment of households, agriculture, and food processing, including food




Table 3 shows the disaggregation of institutions, factors, and activities in the model.
Among the factors, labor and capital are used by all sectors, while water, summer land, and
winter land are used only by agricultural crop activities. The crop activities are differentiated
according to period of land occupation into winter crops, summer crops, and perennial crops.
Outside agriculture, there is a one-to-one mapping between activities (the producing sectors) and
commodities (the outputs produced). Inside agriculture, the two berseem activities and the two7
vegetable activities are both assumed to produce the same commodity (berseem and vegetables,
respectively). Given the quality difference between domestic maize (some 95 percent white
maize) and imported (yellow) maize, the latter is a separate imported commodity without any
domestic production. Moreover, several crop activities produce byproducts that are used as
animal feed. This disaggregation of agriculture makes it possible to capture direct links between
crop and animal activities: crop outputs (most importantly berseem, maize, and various crop by-
products) are used as inputs in the animal activity; animal outputs (manure and animal labor) are
used as inputs in crop activities.
Table 3—Disaggregation of factors, institutions, and activities
Set Elements
Institutions (12) Households (rural and urban, both disaggregated by quintile)
Government
Rest of the world
Factors of production (5) Capital (agricultural and nonagricultural)




Activities (28) Winter crops         (wheat, legumes, long berseem, short berseem,
Summer crops       (cotton, rice, maize [including sorghum], summer
Perennial crops      (fruits, sugarcane)
Other agriculture and (animal agriculture, subsidized bread,
  food processing       unsubsidized bread, subsidized flour,
Other                      (oil, cotton ginning, textiles, other industry,
   winter vegetables, other winter crops)
   vegetables, other summer crops)
   unsubsidized flour, other food processing)
   electricity, construction, government services,
   transportation, other services)
Factors and Production
In crop agriculture, it is assumed that, apart from agronomic and institutional restrictions
(described below), the factors land (summer and winter), water, and capital (primarily
agricultural machinery) are mobile across crops and allocated so as to equalize the marginal
returns to each factor in all relevant crops. In animal agriculture, capital use (primarily animals)Given that the quantity of water stored in the High Dam at Aswan is high, the water
4
supply is set at a level that is above the quantity demanded for any of the simulations presented in
this paper. Hence, land is always in scarce supply. For water, the model records consumption by
crop at a scarcity value of zero.
 For labor, wage gaps between activities may be linked to differences in job security,
5
educational requirements, status of job, and physical (dis)comfort. In agriculture, recorded
monetary returns to land may differ as crops differ in required skills, monitoring, riskiness, and
impact on soil fertility.
8
is fixed and specific to this sector. For two factor types, land and water, excess supply is
possible; if so, the price is zero. The other factors—agricultural labor, crop capital, and animal
capital—are fully utilized with flexible market-clearing wages and rents.
4
Outside of agriculture, capital quantities are fixed by activity; flexible rents assure that
these quantities are fully employed. Nonagricultural labor, the market of which is separate from
the agricultural labor market, is mobile across nonagricultural sectors. Labor employment is fixed
at the level observed in 1996–97 while a flexible wage also clears this part of the labor market.
For selected factors (summer and winter land, and nonagricultural labor), the prices (the
rents or the wages) are differentiated across the demanding activities on the basis of fixed ratios
(calculated from base-year data). This is a reflection of real-world phenomena that are not
modeled explicitly.  When the (aggregate) factor price changes, this is accompanied by
5
proportional changes in the differentiated activity-specific prices of the factor in question.
The production technologies are summarized in Figure 1. Producers are assumed to
maximize profits given their technology (specified by a nested CES value-added function, and
Leontief intermediate input coefficients that are flexible inside agriculture but fixed for other
sectors), and the prices of inputs and outputs. The arguments of the value-added functions are
labor, capital, and (for the crop sectors) a land/water aggregate. The latter is made up of land and
water in fixed proportions. Thus, for crops, substitutability is possible between labor, capital, and
the land/water aggregate on the level of the value-added functions; there is no substitutability







(linear) Labor Capital Sectoral inputs
(CES)
Land Water Imported Domestic
 Given that fodder by-products from crop activities are not traded internationally, fixed
6
intermediate input coefficients would, for the animal activity, generate rigid links between, on the
one hand, the level of animal production and, on the other hand, the levels for the crop activities
producing these by-products. Similar rigidities would appear if intermediate crop demands for
manure were a fixed coefficient.
9
Figure 1—Production technology
The model accounts for two major agronomic area constraints: the area of short berseem (a
crop that precedes cotton) is constrained to equal the cotton area, and the cotton area is limited to
a maximum of one third of the land not covered by perennial crops. Given the relatively short-
run time frame of the analysis, we fix the areas of perennial crops and, as noted above, the size of
animal stock. Agricultural intermediate input coefficients are flexible in the context of producer
minimization of intermediate input costs subject to a limited degree of input substitutability
(given by a CES function) and a fixed aggregate input requirement per unit of the activity.
Agriculture deviates from the more standard treatment for other sectors to avoid rigid links
between crop and animal activities in Egypt’s agriculture, as crop activities supply the animal
activity with the bulk of its intermediate feed inputs.
6See Table A1 for the structure of household factor incomes according to the SAM for
7
1996/97. Low-income households rely more heavily on labor income, in rural areas, from work
in agriculture; high-income households receive the bulk of their incomes from capital and, in
rural areas, land.
For a discussion of these functional forms, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
8
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Two nonagricultural sectors are given special treatment. For the oil activity, the quantities
of output and factor use are fixed at the 1997 level (treating these decisions as exogenous to the
model). For electricity, a flexible capital supply (reflecting surplus capacity) assures that the
nontraded electricity commodity is sold at a fixed price.
Domestic Institutions: Households and Government 
The model captures the circular flow of incomes in the economy. The income of each
factor, generated by the production activities or transferred from the rest of the world (fixed in
foreign currency), is split among the domestic institutions in fixed factor-specific shares.   In
7
addition to factor incomes, households receive transfers from the government and the rest of the
world (fixed in foreign currency). Household income is used to pay direct taxes, save and
consume. Direct taxes and savings are fixed and flexible shares of household income,
respectively. (The reason for the flexible savings share is discussed below.) Disaggregated
consumption is determined by a nested demand system. On the top level, the Almost Ideal
Demand System (AIDS) generates demand for disaggregated food items and an aggregated
nonfood item. At the lower level, Linear Expenditures System (LES) demand functions splits
aggregated nonfood demand into disaggregated items.
8
Besides factor incomes, government revenue consists of transfers from the rest of the world
(fixed in foreign currency) and taxes — direct taxes from households, indirect taxes from
domestic activities, sales tax revenues, and import tariffs. All taxes are ad valorem. Transfers
from the government to households and aggregate government consumption are fixed shares of
nominal GDP. The government buys fixed quantities of commodities in the government
consumption basket. In addition, the government subsidizes part of household consumption of
foodstuffs, transportation, and electricity. For the two nonfoods, the subsidy is a fixed share of
the price paid by the consumer. 11
The treatment of food subsidies is of particular importance. The subsidized food items are
disaggregated into subsidized bread, subsidized flour (purchased by consumers and used as an
input in the production of subsidized bread), and other processed food (representing oil and
sugar). Subsidized bread and flour are available to consumers at fixed prices in nonrationed
quantities. Flexible subsidy rates assure that the consumer price remains unchanged also when
market conditions change. Given that subsidized oil and sugar are rationed and, for most
households, supplemented by market purchases, the subsidy on other processed food has little
direct impact on the quantities consumed of these commodities. Hence, it is treated as a cash
transfer from the government to the households, with the value received by each household
corresponding to the benefit it received from the oil and sugar subsidy in 1996–97. As a result of
leakages, part of the subsidy does not reach the households through the intended channels. In the
model, the part of the subsidy benefit that is leaked is distributed to households in the same way
as nonagricultural capital incomes. This is compatible with the assumption that, at some point in
the marketing channel, the subsidized items are sold at full market prices, generating profits for
retailers and traders, i.e., owners of capital in the nonagricultural part of the economy (a
relatively high-income part of the population). 
The Rest of the World, Foreign Trade, and Commodity Markets
In addition to transferring money which adds to or deducts from the incomes of domestic
institutions, the rest of the world supplies imports and demands exports. For vegetables and
services,  exports are demanded according to constant-elasticity demand curves — the lower the
export supply price, the larger the quantity exported. For all other commodities, Egypt is able to
export or import any quantity it desires at international prices that are fixed in foreign currency.
For imports of wheat and exports of rice and oil, it is assumed that domestic output sold
domestically and traded (exported or imported) commodities are perfect substitutes. As a result,
if these commodities are traded, the domestic price is determined by the domestic-currency
export or import price (transformed from the foreign currency price via the exchange rate and
adjusted for any taxes or subsidies). 
Apart from the above-mentioned special treatment for wheat, rice and oil, imperfect
substitutability or transformability is assumed for foreign trade. The Armington assumption isGovernment savings are invariably positive given that they refer to the difference between
9
current revenues and current spending, excluding items on the government capital account. 
To provide a simple illustration (with fictional numbers), if a cut in direct tax collection
10
is needed to maintain unchanged government savings, the tax rate may, for example, fall by 2
percentage points across all household groups, from 10 percent to 8 percent for an urban high-
income group and from 4 percent to 2 percent for a rural low-income group.
12
used to capture the choice between imports and domestic output under imperfect substitutability:
if a commodity is imported, all domestic demands—household and government consumption,
investment demand, and intermediate demand—are for the same composite commodity, with the
mix between imports and domestic output determined by the assumption that domestic
demanders minimize cost subject to imperfect substitutability, captured by a CES aggregation
function. Similarly, the allocation of domestic output between exports and domestic sales is
determined on the assumption that domestic producers maximize profits subject to imperfect
transformability between these two alternatives, expressed by a constant-elasticity-of-
transformation (CET) function. These assumptions—imperfect substitutability and
transformability—grant the domestic price system a certain degree of independence from
international prices and dampen export and import responses to changes in the producer
environment. 
With the above-mentioned exceptions—partially fixing prices of bread, flour, and
electricity and linking domestic wheat, rice and oil prices to international levels—domestic prices
of domestic outputs and composite commodities are all flexible, performing the task of clearing
relevant markets in a competitive setting where both suppliers and demanders are price-takers.
Macro System Constraints
The macro system constraints (or macro closures) determine the manner in which the
accounts for the government, the rest of the world, and savings-investment are brought into
balance. 
Government savings (also called the current government surplus) are invariably fixed.  For
9
most simulations, a change in the direct tax rate (an equal change in the rate for every household
group) assures that government savings are maintained at the predetermined level.  In the
10
balance of the rest of the world, foreign savings (the current account deficit) are similarly fixed;Savings from nonhousehold sources — the government and the rest of the world — are
11
not free to equilibrate aggregate savings-investment. Given that real investment, (foreign
currency) foreign savings, and government savings are all fixed, the changes in household
savings rates are very small.
13
the exchange rate (the price of foreign exchange) is the equilibrating variable. Given that all
nontrade items (transfers to or from domestic institutions or factors) are fixed, fixing foreign
savings is equivalent to fixing the trade deficit. On the spending side of the savings-investment
balance, aggregate investment is fixed in quantity terms. On the savings side, uniform changes in
the savings rates of each household category are used to generate a level of total savings needed
to finance aggregate investment.
11
The model is homogeneous of degree zero in prices; to assure that only one solution exists,
a price normalization equation, in this case fixing the aggregate consumer price index (CPI), has
been added. Hence, all endogenous price changes are relative to CPI. 
Data Sources
The bulk of the model data is based on a disaggregated SAM (an 85x85 matrix) for
1996–97. This year was selected since it is the year for IFPRI's Egypt Integrated Household
Survey (EIHS). It was constructed on the basis of data from various official publications
including national accounts, government budget, and trade data as well as Egypt's most recent
official Social Accounting Matrix (Central Bank 1995 and 1998; CAPMAS 1996a, 1996b, and
1998; IMF 1998). The EIHS and IFPRI research documents based on the EIHS were the primary
source for data on household consumption and benefits from food subsidies. Data in Kherallah et
al. (1998) were used for flour production. Information from these and other sources were brought
together in one matrix, the disaggregation of which parallels the disaggregation of the current
model. Underlying the construction of such a SAM is an attempt to make the best possible use of
available scattered data. Inevitably imbalances appear when data from different sources and years
are integrated in one framework; a SAM-Entropy program, developed at IFPRI, was used to
generate a balanced model SAM that retains as much as possible of the information contained in
the original data set (Robinson, Cattaneo, and El-Said 1998; Thissen and Löfgren 1998).
For each of the ten households, income and price elasticities for disaggregated foodstuffs
and aggregated nonfood consumption are from Yohannes and Bouis (1999). A variety of sourcesSelected values used are given in Table A5 in the appendix. Consumption elasticities are
12
available on request from the authors. See also Löfgren (1994a).
 For GAMS, see Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus (1998). Rutherford (1995) provides
13
more information on PATH and MILES.
14
were used for other elasticity estimates needed for the household nonfood LES functions as well
as the functions for import aggregation (Armington), domestic output transformation (CET),
production (CES), and (constant-elasticity) export-demand.
12
Mathematical Model Structure, Base Run, Validity, and Time Frame
CGE models are typically formulated and solved as systems of simultaneous equations
exclusively made up of strict equalities. However, to permit the inclusion of inequality
constraints for resource markets and agronomic constraints, the Food CGE model is formulated
and solved as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP), consisting of a set of simultaneous
equations that are a mix of strict equalities and inequalities. The latter are linked to bounded
(price) variables associated with agricultural resources and labor. The GAMS modeling software
is used both to generate the disaggregated SAM and 
to implement the model. The model may be solved with PATH or MILES, two solvers for mixed
complementarity problems.  
13
The base solution of the model is calibrated to exactly replicate the disaggregated 1996-97
SAM. The simulation results indicate the short-run equilibrium responses to changes in policies
and exogenous shocks. Each new solution represents a new equilibrium since agents (producers
and consumers) have fully adjusted themselves to new prices and incomes. It refers to the short
run since capital stocks outside crop agriculture are fixed by sector: the time span is too short for
current investment to lead to changes in installed capital or for capital to move between noncrop
sectors (cf. Hazell and Norton 1986, p. 300).15
4. SIMULATIONS 
The simulations are divided into two sets. The first addresses the consequences of targeting
or eliminating food subsidies. The second set investigates two issues: the impact of using 20
percent maize in subsidized flour and of cracking down on leakage without other changes in
subsidy policy. Unless otherwise noted, we assume that the government uses the savings that
result from the changes in subsidy policy to reduce direct taxes (with an equal percentage cut in
the tax rate for every household group).
Targeting or Eliminating Food Subsidies
The simulations are defined in Table 4 and the results are summarized in Table 5.
(Appendix Tables A2-A4 present  additional simulation data for factor incomes, foreign trade,
and production quantities.) In the first two simulations, subsidy benefits are targeted to the needy,
defined as the bottom two quintiles (40 percent) of the population in both rural and urban areas.
In the last three, parts of or all of the food subsidy program is eliminated.
Table 4—Targeting or eliminating food subsidies: Simulation assumptions
-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-
Targeting Targeting Eliminating Eliminating Eliminating
oil-sugar total food oil-sugar total food total food
subsidy  + subsidy  + subsidy + subsidy  + subsidy  +
income income income income transfer to
tax cut  tax cut tax cut tax cut needy
 percent  change
Oil and sugar subsidy to nonneedy -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Bread and flour subsidy to nonneedy -100 -100 -100
Oil and sugar subsidy to needy -100 -100 -100
Bread and flour subsidy to needy     -100 -100
Leakage for oil and sugar subsidy -62 -62 -100 -100 -100
Leakage for bread and flour subsidy  -60 -100 -100
Government savings to income tax cut  YES YES YES YES
Government savings to cash transfer to needy YES16
Table 5—Targeting or eliminating food subsidies: Summary of simulation results
Base
-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-
Targeting Targeting Eliminating Eliminating Eliminating
oil-sugar total food oil-sugar total food total food
subsidy  + subsidy  + subsidy + subsidy  + subsidy  +
income income income tax income tax transfer to
tax cut tax cut cut cut needy
 percent change from Base
Real per capita household consumption at 1996–97 price
   Rural households (by quintile) 2459.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.6 1.2
       1 1269.3 0.2 0.9 -0.3 -0.7 7.4
       2 1670.2 0.2 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 5.6
       3 2130.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 -0.8
       4 2672.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 -0.8
       5 4552.9 0.0 0.5 0.1 1.2 -0.1
   Urban households (by quintile) 4326.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.7
       1 1713.5 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -2.3 2.8
       2 2456.5 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -1.4 1.7
       3 3361.2 -0.1 -0.8 0.0 -0.6 -2.4
       4 4647.0 -0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 -2.0
       5 9453.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.7 -0.8
   Needy households 1734.1 0.2 0.5 -0.2 -1.1 4.2
   Nonneedy households 4279.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 -1.0
   Average household 3261.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1
Government budget items (mn LE at 1996–97 prices)
   Spending on food subsidies 3741.6 -14.4 -64.2 -23.4 -100.0 -100.0
   Spending on bread and flour 2867.0 0.0 -64.9 0.0 -100.0 -100.0
   Spending on oil and sugar 874.6 -61.6 -61.6 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0
   Income tax revenue 14592.0 -3.5 -16.4 -5.7 -25.4 -1.0
   Cash transfers to needy 3642.5
a
Food and agriculture trade (bn $)
   Net imports 1962.8 0.0 -1.8 0.0 -1.2 -0.4
      Wheat and flour imports           1100.4 0.0 -6.9 0.0 -7.1 -5.9
 
Exchange rate 1.0 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -1.4 -1.2
(LE per unit of foreign currency)
Note: Percent change in all columns except "Base".  Values smaller than ±0.1 are shown as 0.0.   In mn. LE for all
a 
columns.According to IFPRI estimates, the one-time cost of training and materials needed for
14
targeting is around LE 14 mn, an insignificant amount corresponding to 0.4 percent of the total
annual food subsidy budget (or 0.005 percent of GDP). 
Real household consumption (at base prices) is used as welfare indicator. Given that the
15
population is fixed, percentage changes in total and per capita consumption are identical.
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Targeting Oil and Sugar Subsidies to Needy Households (Simulation 1)
In the first simulation, we target oil and sugar subsidies (representing 23 percent of total
food subsidy spending) to the needy in rural and urban areas while eliminating these subsidies for
the top three quintiles. The latter groups continue to have access to these commodities but at full
market prices. Given that these commodities are distributed via red and green ration cards, this
may in practice involve eliminating the red cards and limiting the green cards to the targeted
population. IFPRI research shows that targeting can be achieved at a minimal cost, in particular
since current staff at the Ministry of Trade and Supply could manage the targeting without any
need for new hiring.  We assume that the oil-sugar subsidy leakage declines in proportion to the
14
reduction in subsidy spending. 
In economic terms, given that the ration-card subsidy is treated as inframarginal (i.e., it is
nondistorting, having no direct impact on the quantities consumed of oil and sugar), the subsidy
cut is equivalent to a withdrawal of cash benefits from nonneedy ration cardholders. In addition,
a cash benefit is withdrawn from those who benefitted from the subsidy leakage.
The reductions in total and oil-sugar food subsidy spending are around 14 percent and 62
percent, respectively. This spending cut permits the government to reduce income tax collection
by 3.5 percent (via an equal cut in the percentage tax rate for all households) while keeping
government savings constant. Given that the subsidy was nondistorting, there is no efficiency
gain: aggregate household consumption does not change.  In both regions, the two bottom
15
quintiles enjoy small gains (since they receive the tax cut without any subsidy withdrawal).
Quintiles three and four lose slightly (the tax cut does not fully compensate for the subsidy loss)
whereas the top quintile is unaffected (the tax cut and the subsidy loss were of equivalent cash
value).Most of the simulations of this paper involve changes from price subsidies (a negative
16
indirect tax) to direct taxes  (i.e., shifts from a government tool that works through the price
system to one that does not). Following Robinson and Thierfelder (1999, p. 2), it is clear that
such changes invariably generate declines in real factor returns that confuse the welfare analysis.
For this reason, we report computed changes in the distribution of factor incomes rather than
absolute levels of factor incomes.
See Table A1 for the structure of household factor incomes according to the SAM for
17
1996/97 and for the base simulation.
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Targeting All Food Subsidies to Needy Households (Simulation 2)
In Simulation 2, targeting is extended to all subsidized items, also including bread and
flour (representing the remaining 77 percent of food subsidy spending). Leakage is also reduced
for bread and flour. As expected, the effects are stronger. Since bread and flour subsidies are not
inframarginal (they influence the quantities consumed of bread and flour), an efficiency gain
leads to a slight increase in aggregate consumption. 
Food subsidy spending declines by 64 percent. The spending cut permits a significant
reduction in income tax collection (by 16 percent). The redistribution of incomes in favor of the
needy that follows from subsidy targeting generates increased demand for food and agricultural
commodities, increased factor incomes in agriculture, and reduced incomes in nonagricultural
sectors.    The final impact is a significant gain for the needy, especially in rural areas.
16 17
However, not only the needy but also the top rural quintile sees its position improve. In every
quintile, the rural population does better than its urban counterpart. The major losers are the
urban third and fourth quintiles who suffer significantly from the subsidy cut and receive the bulk
of their incomes from nonagricultural sources.
Higher prices for bread and flour reduce Egypt's wheat and flour imports (by 7 percent)
but, because of substitution toward other products and higher incomes for households with higher
food budget shares, other food imports increase while food exports decrease. The ultimate
decline in net food imports is less than 2 percent. The exchange rate appreciates slightly to
maintain the total (food and nonfood) trade deficit fixed in foreign currency at the initial level.
(Cf. discussion of macro system constraints in Section 3 of this paper.)19
Eliminating Oil and Sugar Subsidies (Simulation 3)
In this simulation, we eliminate oil and sugar subsidies (including leakage). After the
change, the whole population pays full market prices for these commodities. In practice, this
involves eliminating the ration card system (at least for its current purposes). As shown in Table
5, this policy reduces subsidy spending by 23 percent while income tax revenue declines by 6
percent. Aggregate consumption does not change (since the oil-sugar subsidy is nondistorting). In
both regions, the distributional shift is small but unambiguously regressive: as opposed to the
nonneedy, the needy lose more from the subsidy (including leakage) elimination than they gain
from the tax cut.
Eliminating All Food Subsidies (Simulations 4 and 5)
According to Simulation 4, the elimination of all food subsidies permits a cut in direct
taxes by around 25 percent (reducing direct tax revenue by a value similar to the subsidy
savings). The aggregate welfare gain is marginal but positive (similar to the change for
Simulation 2). The impact is strongly regressive: in both regions, the higher the household
quintile, the more positive the impact. As a result, consumption increases by 0.5 percent for
nonneedy households and falls by 1.1 percent for the needy. The pattern of change is, however,
strongly pro-rural — rural consumption increases by 0.6 percent while urban consumption
declines slightly. 
The main reason for the pro-rural pattern is that, due to the subsidy cut for bread and flour,
households shift their demand from products based on wheat grain (a commodity without quality
differences between imports and domestic production and, therefore, with perfect alignment
between domestic and international prices) toward other food products (for which there are
quality differences between domestic output sold at home and traded commodities). As a result, 
the prices of agricultural commodities for which demand increases are boosted without a decline
in the prices of agricultural commodities for which demand decreases. Higher agricultural prices
and incomes disproportionately benefit rural households who, in turn, have higher budget shares
for food. This causes a significant multiplier effect.
The outcome is regressive as a result of the combined impact of changes in subsidies,
agricultural prices and factor incomes. Firstly, the needy lose relatively strongly from the subsidyIn the preceding simulations, it was assumed that leakages decline in proportion to the
18
decline in subsidies reaching the consumers.
20
cut since initial subsidy benefits represent a relatively large share of their total consumption.
Secondly, higher agricultural prices have a more negative impact on the needy due to their
relatively high consumption shares for foodstuffs. Finally, among rural households, the pattern of
change in factor incomes (larger gain for agricultural land and capital than for agricultural labor)
reinforces this regressive pattern. However, for urban households, that rely almost exclusively on
non-agricultural incomes, the impact of the changes in factor incomes is progressive: the non-
needy suffer most from the decline in the share of capital in non-agricultural factor incomes.
The shift in demand from wheat-based commodities that, on the margin, are imported
toward other commodities necessitates an appreciation of the exchange rate (by 1.4 percent) to
maintain the fixed current account and trade deficits. While wheat and flour imports decline
significantly (by 7 percent), net food imports decline by much less. 
The regressive distributional change for Simulation 4 suggests that full subsidy elimination
is not an attractive option unless accompanied by measures that directly benefit the needy. In
Simulation 5, the savings from eliminating the subsidies are used to fund a transfer program
targeted to the needy. According to the simulation, the transfer program receives more than LE
3.6 bn. (i.e., close to the value of the full subsidy program). The distributional impact inside each
region is reversed as a result of the transfer. On the aggregate level, needy households gain 4.2
percent in real consumption while nonneedy incur a loss of 1.0 percent. The pro-rural pattern is
reinforced, compared to  the above simulation because of the food-intensive demand pattern of
the needy households who benefit from the transfer program. In foreign trade, the higher food-
import-intensity in demand is reflected in roughly unchanged net food imports.
Wheat-Maize Flour Mix and Leakage Cuts
The second simulation set analyzes the impact of (1) substituting a wheat-maize flour
blend for all-wheat flour in the production of subsidized flour, used for producing subsidized
bread or sold directly to consumers; and (2) cracking down further on leakages in the food
subsidy system.  In Tables 6 and 7, we present the simulations and summarize the results.
1821
Wheat-Maize Flour Mix (Simulations 6-8)
These simulations explore the impact of a policy shift according to which 100 percent
wheat flour is replaced by a wheat-maize mix with a 20 percent maize share. The government
uses the resulting savings to cut direct taxes. This policy is relatively broad since it introduces
mixed wheat-maize flour not only for the flour used for subsidized bread but also for the
subsidized flour that is sold directly to consumers. Technically, the policy shift is represented by
changed input coefficients in the production of subsidized flour so that 20 percent of the wheat
grain is replaced by maize. It is assumed that household demand behavior is not affected by the
introduction of maize, i.e., there is no significant difference in taste. A higher maize flour
extraction rate (97 percent compared to 82 percent for this type of wheat flour) and a lower maize
grain price (in the base year 23 percent below the wheat price) give rise to government savings
(Khalil 1999, p. 123; Ministry of Agriculture 1998, pp. 135, 142).
Table 6—Introducing wheat-maize flour and cutting leakage: Simulation assumptions
  -6- -7- -8- -9-
 Wheat- Wheat- Wheat-maize Leakage
maize maize flour flour + elimination
flour + + income income tax + transfer to
income tax cut + cut + leakage needy
tax cut leakage cut cut + yield
increase
 percent  change
Leakage for oil and sugar subsidy -100
Leakage for bread and flour subsidy  -100 -100 -100
Government savings to income tax cut YES YES YES
Government savings to cash transfer to YES
needy
20 percent maize in subsidized flour YES YES YES
Maize yield increase and fixed maize area YES
The initial effect of the policy shift is that 20 percent of the wheat demanded for use in
production of subsidized flour is shifted to maize at 65 percent of the initial cost, raising the 22
Table 7—Introducing wheat-maize flour and cutting leakage: Summary of simulation results
Base  Maize- Maize- Maize-wheat Leakage
-6- -7- -8- -9-
wheat flour wheat flour flour + income elimination
+ income + income tax cut + + transfer to
tax cut tax cut + leakage cut + needy
leakage cut yield increase
Real per capita household consumption at 1996–97  percent change from Base
prices
   Rural households (by quintile) 2459.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1
       1 1269.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 1.4
       2 1670.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.0
       3 2130.9 0.1 0.2 0.5 -0.2
       4 2672.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 -0.2
       5 4552.9 0.1 0.1 0.4 -0.2
   Urban households (by quintile) 4326.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.1
       1 1713.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 0.9
       2 2456.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.5
       3 3361.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.3
       4 4647.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.3
       5 9453.2 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.3
   Needy households 1734.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.9
   Nonneedy households 4279.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.3
   Average household 3261.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
Government budget items (mn LE at 1996–97 prices)
   Spending on food subsidies 3741.6 -5.9 -17.4 -19.5 -17.6
   Spending on bread and flour subsidies 2867.0 -7.7 -22.7 -25.5 -14.9
   Spending on oil and sugar subsidies 874.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -26.4
   Income tax revenue 14591.0 -1.3 -4.0 -3.9 -0.1
   Cash transfers to needy 596.8
a
Food and agriculture trade (bn $)
   Net imports 1962.8 -6.0 -6.0 -10.9 0.1
      Wheat and flour imports 1100.4 -12.7 -12.7 -19.8 0.1
Exchange rate (LE per unit of for. curr.) 1.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 0.1
Maize yield (normalized to 1 for 1.0 0.1 0.1 11.4 0.0
   Base)
Maize area (mn. feddans) 2.0 11.6 11.6 0.0 0.0
Note: Percent change in all columns except "Base".   In mn. LE in all columns.
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demand for maize with a resulting increase in maize production (by almost 12 percent). This
leads to reduced subsidy spending, reflecting a decline in the per-unit subsidy needed to maintain
fixed prices for subsidized bread and flour. In Simulation 6, total food subsidy spending declines
by 6 percent. The resulting government savings permit a decline in direct tax collection by 1.3
percent. The shift of agricultural demand from a traded commodity (wheat) toward a nontradable
leads to a slight increase in agricultural factor incomes which, at the household level, benefits
rural households. Net food imports decline substantially (by 6 percent), a reflection of resource
savings (the maize flour requires fewer resources than the wheat flour for which it substitutes)
Simulation 7 looks at the impact of combining the introduction of the wheat-maize flour
mix with an elimination of leakages for subsidized bread and flour. The rationale for this
simulation is the difficulty of diverting mixed flour to unintended uses. 
Because of the addition of the leakage cut, the decline in spending on bread and flour
subsidies and the direct tax cut are almost tripled, i.e., from the perspective of saving government
resources, the main impact of the maize-wheat flour program may come from the fact that it
makes leakage more difficult, not from a lower cost of maize flour. Incomes decline for
nonagricultural capital, the recipient of leaked subsidy benefits. The net impact is a small but
progressive impact on income distribution. Other effects are very minor.
In Egypt, there is considerable potential for raising maize yields (Harrison 1996, p. 241;
Khalil 1999, p.121), possibly annulling the need to increase the maize area in the face of
increased demand for white maize for use in subsidized bread and flour products. Simulation 8
poses the following questions: What is the increase in maize yields needed to avoid an increase
in the maize area in the context of the shift to a wheat-maize flour mix and elimination of
subsidized bread and flour leakage? What are the broader economic repercussions of such yield
change? Technically, the simulation is implemented by fixing the maize area while endogenizing
maize land productivity. 
As shown in Table 7, an 11 percent yield increase is required (very close to the relative
area increase for Simulation 7). The resulting shift in the supply curve for maize reduces the
maize price, further cutting the government subsidy bill. There is an increase in agricultural and
rural incomes, bringing about a multiplier process that boosts demand for agricultural products,
including crops competing with maize. At the new equilibrium, consumption is higher for every24
household category, with the largest gains for needy households and a slightly larger aggregate
gain in rural areas. However, due to the income redistribution to rural households (who pay
smaller income shares in direct taxes), the direct tax cut declines slightly compared to Simulation
7. Increased productivity of land in maize production (and a return of the maize area to the base
level) gives rise to changes in agricultural resource allocation, including a shift toward wheat and
away from cotton and short berseem. The result is a significant decline in wheat and flour
imports and an overall decline in net food and agricultural imports (by 11 percent for the latter). 
Leakage Cuts (Simulation 9)
The fact that almost 18 percent of Egypt’s food subsidies leak to unintended beneficiaries
suggests that leakage reductions may permit considerable government savings that can be
allocated to other purposes. At the same time, it is possibly costly to intensify efforts to minimize
leakage further. It is also important to keep in mind that leaked subsidies also benefit
"somebody" although the (little known) beneficiaries differ from those intended. As noted earlier,
the model data base assumes that the initial benefits from leakage are distributed in the same way
as nonagricultural capital incomes.
To explore the impact of leakage cuts in isolation from the introduction of mixed wheat-
maize flour, Simulation 9 considers the extreme case of full elimination of the food subsidy
leakage with the savings allocated to direct transfers to the needy (see Tables 4 and 5). The
analysis does not consider the (unknown) costs of reducing leakages and transferring benefits to
the needy. The subsidy spending cuts (close to 18 percent on the aggregate level) reflect the
initial leakage pattern. Close to LE 600 mn are allocated to the needy (as cash or cash-equivalent
transfers). The distributional impact is strongly pro-needy and marginally pro-rural. As indicated
by the small changes in foreign trade, the broader repercussions are limited, a reflection of the
fact that the existing food subsidy program remains in place. In an additional simulation (not
reported here), the savings were used to reduce income tax collections. Under this assumption,
the distributional change is negligible (for the different households, real consumption changes by
0.1 percent or less). The pattern of change was similar but the impact even smaller when leakage
elimination was limited to oil and sugar benefits. In sum, given that the simulation applies to a
relatively extreme case, it seems that the broader economic impact of a crackdown is unlikely to25
be significant unless the savings are carefully targeted. When considering the desirability of
intensifying its anti-leakage crackdown, the government also needs to consider the costs
involved.26
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, an economy-wide model of the Egyptian economy has been used to
quantitatively explore the short-run equilibrium effects of alternative cost-saving scenarios for
the food subsidy system. The simulated impact of targeting or fully eliminating oil and sugar
subsidies is relatively small, reflecting the limited size of this program. The savings permit a
reduction in income taxes of 4-6 percent. The impact on disaggregated household welfare is also
small (changes in real consumption for the different household types are between  0.2 percent
and -0.3 percent). It is progressive if the subsidy is targeted to the needy and regressive if it is
eliminated.
When similar measures are simulated for the entire food subsidy system, the impact is
predictably much stronger, including important indirect effects. Nevertheless, although the
current bread and flour subsidy program distorts consumer decisions, only very minor efficiency
gains follow from targeting or eliminating these subsidies. 
In tandem with a direct tax cut, the targeting of all food subsidies has pro-needy and pro-
rural effects. It raises the total consumption of the needy by 0.5 percent with little change for the
rest of the population. The strongest gains are recorded for the two lowest quintiles in rural areas,
whose consumption goes up by around 1.0 percent. Only the urban households in the third and
fourth quintiles lose significantly, by 0.5-0.8 percent. This outcome is influenced by the
redistribution of buying power in favor of needy households who allocate larger shares of their
consumption to food. Increased demand for food items (other than wheat) raises agricultural
prices and the incomes of the rural population in general and the poor in particular.
The distributional consequences of a full elimination of food subsidies in combination with
a tax cut (reducing direct tax revenues by 25 percent) remain pro-rural; aggregate rural and urban
consumption change by 0.6 percent and -0.2 percent, respectively. However, the pattern of
welfare change is regressive. The nonneedy households enjoy a consumption increase by 0.5
percent while the needy suffer a loss of 1.1 percent. On the other hand, if the savings from fully
eliminating food subsidies instead are used for transfers to the needy, the household impact is
drastically different. In addition to the transfer benefit, the rural needy gain strongly from demand
shifts to and within agriculture, raising the consumption of the two lowest rural quintiles by 6-727
percent. On a more aggregate level, consumption increases by 1.2 percent for rural households
and by 4.2 percent for needy households. Urban and nonneedy households register small losses.
The targeting or elimination of food subsidies has a significant impact on Egypt’s foreign
trade if the entire subsidy system is covered by the policy shifts. The declines are by 6-7 percent
for wheat and flour imports but, due to substitution effects on the consumption side, much
smaller for total net food and agricultural imports.
Subsidy costs are reduced significantly when maize substitutes for 20 percent of the flour
used to produce subsidized bread and flour, especially if leakage can be eliminated. Imports of
wheat and flour and total net imports of food and agricultural items decline, especially if maize
yields increase. If so, the gains in household well-being may also be noteworthy; if not, the
impact is pro-rural but negligible.
What are the policy implications of these results? Some of the simulated policy changes
seem attractive assuming that the government is looking for ways of reducing food subsidy
spending without hurting the needy. A first and relatively easy step is to target ration cards for oil
and sugar subsidies to needy households while using the savings to reduce direct taxes. The gains
for the needy would obviously be larger if the savings were instead used to fund programs that
provide benefits to the needy (for example cash or cash-equivalent transfers). Experience from
targeting these subsidies and developing programs for the needy may make it easier to introduce
similar changes for the bread and flour subsidy programs. The program of using mixed maize and
wheat flour in the production of subsidized bread reduces subsidy spending, permitting the
allocation of government resources to other uses, including targeted programs for the needy.
Against this background, expanding this program geographically and extending it to subsidized
flour sold directly to the consumers are attractive possibilities. 28
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Table A1—Structure of household factor incomes in SAM for 1996–97 (percent)
 
Rural households Urban households
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Labor 43.9 39.9 31.9 22.5 17.7 56.6 53.8 47.9 35.0 28.3
   Agriculture 19.8 16.7 10.4 6.3 4.2 3.1 2.8 2.3 1.3 0.7
   Nonagriculture 24.1 23.2 21.5 16.2 13.5 53.5 50.9 45.6 33.8 27.6
Capital 42.6 45.4 51.0 57.8 61.4 41.8 44.6 50.5 63.4 70.1
   Agriculture 7.4 8.0 9.2 10.6 11.2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
   Nonagriculture 35.3 37.5 41.8 47.2 50.1 40.9 43.8 49.6 62.4 69.2
Land 13.5 14.7 17.1 19.7 21.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
Source: Model SAM for 1996/97.
Table A2—Simulation results: distribution of factor incomes
Base
a
-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-
Targeting Targeting Eliminating Eliminating Eliminating
oil-sugar total food oil-sugar total food total food
subsidy  + subsidy  + subsidy + subsidy  + subsidy +
income tax income tax income tax income tax transfer to
cut cut cut cut needy
change from Base
Agriculture 17.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.7
       Labor 4.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3
       Land and Capital 12.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.5
Nonagriculture 82.7 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.6 -0.7
       Labor 27.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
       Capital 55.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.4
Total 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-6- -7- -8- -9-
Wheat-maize Wheat-maize Wheat-maize flour Leakage
flour + flour + transfer + transfer to needy elimination
transfer to to needy + + leakage cut +  + transfer to
needy leakage cut yield increase needy
change from Base
Agriculture 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
       Labor 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
       Land and Capital 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Nonagriculture -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
       Labor 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
       Capital -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Base = percent share of total factor income.
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Table A3—Simulation results: foreign trade
Base
a
-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-
Targeting Targeting Cutting oil- Cutting total Cutting total
oil-sugar total food sugar food food
subsidy  + subsidy  + subsidy + subsidy  + subsidy  +
income tax  income tax income tax income tax transfer to
cut  cut cut  cut  needy
 percent change from Base
Food and agriculture
   Net imports 1962.8 0.0 -1.8 0.0 -1.2 -0.4
      Imports 2333.6 0.0 -2.6 0.0 -2.4 -1.8
          Wheat and flour 1100.4 0.0 -6.9 0.0 -7.1 -5.9
      Exports 370.8 0.0 -6.9 0.1 -8.8 -8.9
Other goods and services
   Net imports 161.8 -0.2 22.3 0.5 14.6 4.9
      Imports 15962.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Exports 15800.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.1
-6- -7- -8- -9-
Wheat- Wheat- Wheat-maize Leakage
maize flour maize flour flour + elimination
+ transfer + transfer to transfer to + transfer to
to needy needy + needy + needy
leakage leakage cut +
 cut yield increase
 percent change from Base
Food and agriculture
   Net imports -6.0 -6.0 -10.9 0.1
      Imports -5.9 -5.9 -9.3 0.0
          Wheat and flour      -12.7 -12.7 -19.8 0.1
      Exports -5.5 -5.5 -0.5 -0.4
Other goods and services
   Net imports 72.5 72.4 132.5 -1.7
      Imports 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0
      Exports -0.7 -0.7 -1.1 0.0
Notes: Changes smaller than 0.05 percent are set at zero.  For all simulations total net imports (the trade
deficit) are fixed at $2124.6 mn.
 Units for Base: million $ at 1996–97 prices.
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Table A4—Simulation results: real production
Base oil-sugar total food sugar total food total food
a
-1- -2- -3- -4- -5-
Targeting Targeting Cutting oil- Cutting Cutting
subsidy  + subsidy  + subsidy + subsidy  + subsidy  +
income tax income tax income tax income tax  transfer to
cut  cut cut cut needy
 percent change from base
Agriculture
   Winter crops
       Wheat 5.1 0.0 -4.1 0.0 -9.3 -10.0
       Legumes 0.6 0.0 1.5 -0.1 2.7 4.2
       Long berseem 1.9 0.0 2.7 0.0 3.7 3.8
       Short berseem 0.4 0.0 -7.9 0.0 -7.9 -7.9
       Winter vegetables 3.0 -0.1 22.3 0.1 45.9 47.0
       Other winter crops 4.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.0 1.1
   Summer crops
       Cotton 3.2 0.0 -7.9 0.0 -8.0 -8.0
       Rice 3.2 0.0 3.4 0.0 6.9 7.0
       Maize 4.3 0.0 3.5 0.0 4.9 4.9
       Summer vegetables 7.1 0.0 -7.8 -0.1 -17.3 -17.6
       Other summer crops 3.4 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.0 1.1
   Perennials
       Fruits 6.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
       Sugarcane 1.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 1 1.1
   Animal agriculture 17.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Nonagriculture
   Petroleum 19.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Subsidized bread 3.4 0.0 -19.5 0.0 -29.6 -29.2
   Nonsubsidized bread 1.5 0.0 2.2 0.0 2.6 2.8
   Subsidized flour 4.1 0.0 -15.5 0.0 -23.3 -22.9
   Nonsubsidized flour 2.8 0.0 2.3 0.0 3.3 3.4
   Other processed food 39.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.2 1.3
   Cotton ginning 3.9 0.0 -7.9 0.0 -8.0 -8.0
   Textiles 30.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
   Other industry 56.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
   Electricity 7.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.7 -0.5
   Construction 33.8 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
   Government services 25.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Transportation 28.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
   Other services 119.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.035
Table A4 (cont’d)
-6- -7- -8- -9-
Wheat-maize Wheat-maize Wheat-maize Leakage
flour + flour + flour + transfer elimination
transfer to transfer to to needy + + transfer to
needy needy + leakage cut + needy
leakage cut yield increase
 percent change from base
Agriculture
   Winter crops
       Wheat -5.3 -5.3 1.0 0.0
       Legumes -0.4 -0.4 0.5 0.3
       Long berseem 1.5 1.5 1.9 0.0
       Short berseem -8.0 -8.0 -7.7 0.1
       Winter vegetables 38.5 38.6 -6.9 -0.4
       Other winter crops 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Summer crops
       Cotton -8.0 -8.0 -7.9 0.0
       Rice -2.3 -2.3 0.4 -0.2
       Maize 11.6 11.6 11.4 0.0
       Summer vegetables -16.1 -16.1 4.3 0.2
       Other summer crops 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Perennials
       Fruits -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.0
       Sugarcane 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Animal agriculture -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Nonagriculture
   Petroleum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Subsidized bread 0.7 0.7 -0.3 0.0
   Nonsubsidized bread 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0
   Subsidized flour 0.7 0.7 -0.3 0.0
   Nonsubsidized flour 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0
   Other processed food 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Cotton ginning -8.0 -8.0 -7.9 0.0
   Textiles -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
   Other industry 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Electricity 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
   Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Government services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Transportation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Units for Base: bn LE at 1996–97 prices.
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Table A5—Elasticity values used in the model
CET CES Armington Intermediate Export
demand
   Winter crops
       Wheat 0.3 0.3
       Legumes 0.5 0.3 0.3
       Long berseem 0.3 0.3
       Short berseem 0.3 0.3
       Winter vegetables 0.8 0.3 3.0 0.3 0.3
       Other winter crops 0.3 0.3
   Summer crops
       Cotton 0.3 0.3
       Rice 0.3 0.3
       Maize 0.3 1.6 0.3
       Summer vegetables 0.8 0.3 3.0 0.3 0.3
       Other summer crops 0.3 0.3
   Perennials
       Fruits 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.3
       Sugarcane 0.3     0.3
   Animal agriculture 0.3 0.3 1.2
Nonagriculture
   Petroleum 0.1 2.0
   Subsidized bread 0.6
   Nonsubsidized bread 0.6
   Subsidized flour 0.6
   Nonsubsidized flour 0.6 3.0
   Other processed food 2.0 0.6 0.3
   Cotton ginning 0.6
   Textiles 2.0 0.6 0.3
   Other industry 2.0 0.6 0.3
   Electricity 0.4
   Construction 0.6
   Government services 0.5
   Transportation 2.0 0.6 1.0 0.3
   Other services 2.0 0.6 1.0 0.3
Note: For a brief survey of elasticities of CGE models, see Löfgren (1994a). Abbreviations:
CET             Elasticity of transformation between exports and domestic sales in CET function;
CES            Elasticity of factor substitution in CES value-added functions;
Armington     Elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic goods in CES aggregation function;
Intermediate  Elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs in agriculture.a0A z0Z
a0ACR (dA) f0F (dZ)
c0C f0FSUB
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Table A6—Mathematical Statement for the Egypt Food CGE Model
 1,2
SETS
activities institutions [households, government
(= gov), rest of the world (= row)] and
factors
crop activities factors [labor & capital factors, land-
water ( = l-w)]
disaggregated commodities   subfactors (summer and winter land,
water)




consumer price index government consumption
weight of commodity c in fixed investment demand for c
consumer price index
foreign savings (foreign currency) nominal GDP share transferred from
government to household h 
government savings share of domestic institution i in
income of factor f
intermediate input c per unit of indirect tax rates for activity a
activity a
quantity of subfactor f per unit of import tariff rate (incl. sales tax)
land-water aggregate for activity a
share of post-tax income of rate of sales tax
household h to savings
world price of exports (foreign transfer to institution/factor z from
currency) institution/factor z'
world price of imports (foreign subsidy transfer to institution/factor z
currency) (for rationed commodity or leakage) 
stock change for commodity c direct tax rate for household h
supply of factor f yield of commodity c per unit of
activity a
supply of subfactor f rate of household consumption subsidy

















government expenditures demand for factor f from activity a 
household consumption demand for subfactor f from activity a
expenditures
exchange rate (units of foreign consumption demand for c from
currency per unit of domestic household h
currency)
nominal GDP at market prices intermediate input demand for c
output revenue per unit of activity imports of c
a
price of domestic output sold supply of composite commodity c
domestically
price of exports total output of commodity c
price of imports wage of factor f
price of composite good wage distortion factor
activity value-added (net) price wage of subfactor
average producer price for income of factor f
commodity c
level of activity a  government income
domestic sales of domestic output income of domestic institution i from
factor f
exports income of household h
Functions
CES(•) constant elasticity of substitution LES(•) linear expenditure system
CET(•) constant elasticity of AIDS(•) almost ideal demand system
transformationPMc ’ pwmc@(1%tmc)@EXR c0C



















QAa ’ CES[QFfa] a0A











QXc ’ CET[QEc, QDc] c0C
QEc
QDc
’ CET ( PEc
PDc
c0C










# Equation Domain Description
Price Block
1 import price in domestic currency
2 export price in domestic currency
3
average demand price of composite
commodity
4
average producer price of
commodity c
5 gross activity price (=unit revenue)
6 activity value added (net) price
7 land-water rent by crop activity
Supply and Trade Block
8 level of production activity
9
3 demand for factor f from activity a
10 intermediate input demand
11 demand for subfactor f from crop
activity a
12 output of commodity c
13 function transforming output to
exports and domestic sales
14
FOC for output transformation
15 function aggregating imports and
domestic sales to composite supply
16
FOC for commodity aggregationYFf ’ j
a0A
Wf @WFDISTfa@QFfa % trsubf,gov f0F




YIFhf % shrgdph,gov@GDP % trh,row@EXR
% trsubh,gov
h0H
EHh ’ (1 & mpsh)@(1 & tyh)@YHh & trrow,h@EXR h0H






([(1&óc)@PQc , PQn&f@QHn&f,h] c0CNF
h0H







































QQc ’ QINTc % j
h0H











17 income of factor f






21 disaggregated food and aggregated
household consumption demand for
non-food
22 consumer price index for non-food









27 market equilibrium for composite
commodity (S=D)
28 market equilibrium for factors
(S=D)
29










gsav ’ YG & EG
j
h0H










30 current account balance (in foreign
currency)
31 government savings constraint
32
savings-investment balance
33 consumer price index (numéraire)
1. The following notational convention is used: Subscripts are set indices. Variables are written with upper-case Latin letters.
    Parameters appear as Greek letters or as lower-case Latin letters. 
2. The mathematical statement is simplified. (See Section 3 for a fuller verbal model description.) The following aspects
     have been suppressed: (i) perfect substitutability/transformability between exports, imports and domestic output for selected
     commodities  (in place of imperfect substitutability/transformability); (ii) constant-elasticity demand curves for selected export
     commodities (in place of fixed foreign-currency export price); (iii) domain controls (limiting equations and variables to
     subsets of the sets indicated); (iv) price-responsiveness of selected intermediate input coefficients; (v) agronomic constraints;
     (vi) flexing of subsidy rate and fixing of total consumer price,  , for subsidized  commodities with a fixed
     consumer price.
3. CES , CET , AIDS  and LES indicate relationships derived from the respective functions. In general, WF is flexible and
*   *   *    * 
    WFDIST is fixed. Exceptions include the aggregate land-water factor (for which WF is fixed while WFDIST is flexible for all
     land-water crop activity pairs), and factors or activities with special treatment (activity-specific capital for noncrop activities
     and special assumptions for the oil and electricity activities.
4. Complementary constraints are shown in brackets in the equation column.